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____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
Roy Allen Green appeals the District Court’s order 
dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion challenging his 
sentence arising from his conviction for assault with intent to 
commit murder.  In setting Green’s sentence, the District Court 
determined that he was a career offender under the residual 
clause of the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines.  Green 
contends that the residual clause in the career offender 
Sentencing Guideline is unconstitutionally vague pursuant 
to Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), in which 
the Supreme Court voided the similar residual clause in the 
Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”).  The Government, 
relying upon the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Beckles v. 
United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017) — holding that vagueness 
challenges cannot be brought to the advisory Sentencing 
Guidelines — contends that Green’s motion is untimely 
because the one-year statute of limitations period to bring a 
challenge on collateral review had passed by the time he filed 
this motion.  We must decide whether Johnson constituted a 
newly recognized right, thus providing Green a year from 
when Johnson was decided to file his § 2255 motion.  We 
conclude that it did not, and will therefore affirm the District 
Court. 
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I. 
 
In 2001, Green was sentenced to 687 months of 
imprisonment for convictions on federal drug and firearms 
charges, including a conviction for conspiracy to distribute 
methamphetamine.  Later that same year, while serving that 
sentence, Green attacked another inmate with a shank.  Green 
then pleaded guilty to one count of assault with intent to 
commit murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(1).  At 
sentencing, the District Court determined that Green qualified 
as a “career offender” under the residual clause of the then-
mandatory Sentencing Guidelines.1  The Presentence Report 
(“PSR”) did not specify which of Green’s prior convictions 
qualified as predicate offenses, but cross-referenced sections 
of the PSR that listed a federal drug conviction and California 
convictions for robbery and assault on a parole agent.  Green’s 
classification as a career offender resulted in a Guidelines 
range of 151 to 188 months of imprisonment.  Absent the 
career-offender designation, Green’s Guidelines range would 
have been 100 to 125 months of imprisonment.  Green did not 
object to the PSR, and the District Court sentenced him to 151 
months of imprisonment, to run consecutively to the 687 
months of imprisonment that he was already serving. 
 
Green timely appealed, and we ultimately affirmed his 
conviction and sentence.  United States v. Green, 117 F. App’x 
                                              
1 United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) 
§ 4B1.2(a) (2001) (“The term ‘crime of violence’ means any 
offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment 
for a term exceeding one year, that . . . otherwise involves 
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury 
to another.”). 
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185, 185 (3d Cir. 2004).  Within one year of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Johnson, Green filed a motion to vacate, set 
aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to § 2255.  Green argued 
that in light of Johnson, the residual clause of the mandatory 
Sentencing Guidelines is unconstitutionally vague.  The 
District Court stayed the motion until the Supreme Court 
decided Beckles.  After Beckles was decided, the District Court 
dismissed Green’s motion as untimely under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255(f), holding that Green did not assert a right that was 
newly recognized by the Supreme Court.  The District Court 
granted a certificate of appealability “on the issue of 
whether United States v. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), 
‘newly recognize[s]’ a right for petitioner under 28 U.S.C. § 
2255(f)(3).”  Appendix (“App.”) 10.  This timely appeal 
followed. 
 
II. 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2255.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
2253(a) & (c).  On appeal of an order denying a § 2255 motion, 
we review a district court’s legal conclusions de novo and 
factual findings for clear error.  United States v. Travillion, 759 
F.3d 281, 289 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 
III. 
 
Green argues that the Supreme Court’s opinion 
in Johnson, holding the residual clause of the ACCA 
unconstitutionally vague, also applies to cases involving the 
residual clause in the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines.  The 
Government argues that due to the Supreme Court’s recent 
opinion in Beckles, which held that the residual clause in the 
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advisory Sentencing Guidelines could not be subject to a void-
for-vagueness challenge pursuant to Johnson, we need not 
reach the merits of Green’s motion because Green’s challenge 
is untimely.  The Government contends that the statute of 
limitations began running when Green’s conviction became 
final in 2005, and thus the one-year statute of limitations period 
to bring a challenge on collateral review had long since passed 
by the time he filed this motion.  Green responds that his 
motion is timely because it was filed within one year 
of Johnson, which restarted his limitations period by 
recognizing a new rule of constitutional law that applies to 
Green. 
 
A motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is subject to a 
one-year limitations period that runs from: 
 
(1)  the date on which the judgment of conviction 
becomes final; 
(2) the date on which the impediment to making 
a motion created by governmental action in 
violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States is removed, if the movant was 
prevented from making a motion by such 
governmental action; 
(3) the date on which the right asserted was 
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that 
right has been newly recognized by the Supreme 
Court and made retroactively applicable to cases 
on collateral review; or 
(4)  the date on which the facts supporting the 
claim or claims presented could have been 
discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 
 
7 
 
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).  Accordingly, a petitioner seeking 
collateral review under § 2255 will have one year from the date 
on which his judgment of conviction is final to file his 
petition.  Id. § 2255(f)(1); see also Dodd v. United States, 545 
U.S. 353, 357 (2005).  The statute also provides for three 
limited, alternative circumstances in which the one-year 
limitations period will begin to run.  Here, Green contends that 
§ 2255(f)(3) applies, and that Johnson restarted his statute of 
limitations period by newly recognizing the right on which his 
petition relies.  In Dodd, the Supreme Court held that the 
limitations period restarts on the date of the Supreme Court 
decision initially recognizing the right, and not the date of the 
decision that thereafter makes the right retroactively applicable 
to cases on collateral review.  See 545 U.S. at 357 (“An 
applicant has one year from the date on which the right he 
asserts was initially recognized by this Court.”). 
 
We must begin with the text of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) to 
address Green’s timeliness argument.  See Rotkiske v. Klemm, 
890 F.3d 422, 425 (3d Cir. 2018) (en banc).  Plainly, if the 
“right” that Green “assert[s]” has been “recognized” by the 
Supreme Court within one year of the date Green filed his 
motion, then his motion is timely.  We must determine whether 
the Supreme Court has recognized the right asserted by Green. 
 
As the Supreme Court has observed, “[a] common . . . 
definition of the word ‘recognize’ is ‘to acknowledge or treat 
as valid.’”  Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 327 (2011) 
(quoting Random House Dictionary of the English Language 
1611 (2d ed. 1987)).  Thus, the Supreme Court must have 
formally acknowledged or treated as valid the right asserted by 
Green for it to be “recognized” within the meaning of 
§ 2255(f)(3).  This recognition of a right must also be 
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definite.  See United States v. Brown, 868 F.3d 297, 301 (4th 
Cir. 2017) (“To ‘recognize’ something is (1) ‘to acknowledge 
[it] formally’ or (2) ‘to acknowledge or take notice of [it] in 
some definite way.’” (quoting Recognize, Merriam-Webster 
Tenth Collegiate Dictionary 976 (1996))). 
 
 Green contends that the right underlying his claim was 
initially recognized when Johnson was decided, and maintains 
that the statute of limitations period began to run anew from that 
point.  The Government argues that Green’s motion, filed 
within one year of Johnson but more than one year after his 
conviction became final, is untimely because the limitations 
period in § 2255(f)(3) does not apply, as the Supreme Court 
has neither recognized nor made retroactively available the 
right on which Green relies. 
 
To determine whether Green can rely on Johnson to 
challenge his sentence, we next turn to the Supreme Court’s 
decisions on the ACCA’s residual clause and the Sentencing 
Guidelines.  In Johnson, the Supreme Court considered a due 
process challenge to the residual clause of the ACCA, 18 
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).  The ACCA applies to a defendant 
convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g).  See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).  Ordinarily, the 
punishment for a violation of this prohibition is a maximum of 
10 years of imprisonment.  See id.  However, if a defendant is 
an armed career criminal, the ACCA imposes a mandatory 
minimum sentence of 15 years and a statutory maximum 
sentence of life.  Id. § 924(e)(1).  A defendant qualifies as an 
armed career criminal if, in relevant part, he has three or more 
previous convictions for a “violent felony” or a “serious drug 
offense.”  Id.  Before Johnson, the definition of “violent 
felony” had three operative clauses:  one enumerating offenses, 
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one enumerating elements, and the residual clause.  Id. § 
924(e)(2)(B).  The residual clause defined a crime as a “violent 
felony” if it “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious 
potential risk of physical injury to another.”  Id. 
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
 
The Supreme Court in Johnson held that the ACCA 
residual clause was unconstitutionally vague.  135 S. Ct. at 
2563.  The Court explained that the Fifth Amendment’s 
vagueness doctrine bars the Government from “taking away 
someone’s life, liberty, or property under a criminal law so 
vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the 
conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary 
enforcement.”  Id. at 2556.  These principles apply to laws 
“defining elements of crimes” or “fixing sentences.”  Id. at 
2557.  The ACCA was a law “fixing sentences.”  Beckles, 137 
S. Ct. at 892.  The Court in Johnson held that “[i]ncreasing a 
defendant’s sentence under the [residual] clause denies due 
process of law.”  135 S. Ct. at 2557.  In Welch v. United States, 
the Supreme Court resolved the issue of Johnson’s 
retroactivity, holding that it is retroactive to cases on collateral 
review.  136 S. Ct. 1257, 1264 (2016). 
 
 In Beckles, the Supreme Court considered a challenge 
relying upon Johnson to the residual clause in the career 
offender Guideline.  137 S. Ct. at 890.  The career offender 
Guideline applies where “the instant offense of conviction is a 
felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance 
offense” and “the defendant has at least two prior felony 
convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance 
offense.”  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 (2011).  Until recently, the career 
offender Guideline defined a “crime of violence” as 
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any offense under federal or state law, 
punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year that— 
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the 
person of another, or 
(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, 
involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves 
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another. 
 
Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 890-91 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) 
(2008) (emphasis added)). 
 
The residual clause of the career offender Guideline (the 
emphasized language immediately above) became effective 
November 1, 1989.  See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 268 (1989).  
It has spanned two eras in sentencing under the Sentencing 
Guidelines:  before and after the Supreme Court’s decision 
in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  
Before Booker, the Sentencing Guidelines had “the force and 
effect of laws” and were “mandatory and binding on all 
judges.”  Id. at 233-34.  District courts were required to 
“impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range,” set by 
the Guidelines.  Id. at 234 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)).  
In Booker, however, the Supreme Court held that the 
Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment.  Id. at 
226–27.  The Court then rendered the Guidelines “advisory.”  Id. 
at 245.  Now, after Booker, a court must “consider Guidelines 
ranges” but may “tailor the sentence in light of other statutory 
concerns as well.”  Id. at 245 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).  The 
resulting sentence may vary from the Guidelines range.  United 
States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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 The Supreme Court in Beckles rejected a challenge, 
based upon Johnson, to the residual clause in the advisory 
Guidelines.  Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 890.  The Court held that “the 
advisory Guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenges.”  Id.  
Because the advisory Guidelines do not “fix the permissible 
sentences for criminal offenses,” the Court determined that the 
advisory Guidelines cannot be challenged as constitutionally 
vague.  Id. at 892 (emphasis omitted).  Rather, the advisory 
Guidelines “merely guide the exercise of a court’s 
discretion.”  Id.  The Court explained that the two principles 
governing the vagueness doctrine — notice and avoiding 
arbitrary enforcement — do not apply to the advisory 
Guidelines.  Id. at 894. 
 
The Court in Beckles limited its holding to the advisory 
guidelines.  Id. at 890.  It did not address the mandatory 
Sentencing Guidelines.  Indeed, in a concurring opinion 
in Beckles, Justice Sotomayor noted that the majority left “open 
the question whether defendants sentenced to terms of 
imprisonment before [the Supreme Court’s] decision in United 
States v. Booker—that is, during the period in which the 
Guidelines did ‘fix the permissible range of sentences,’—may 
mount vagueness attacks on their sentences.”  Id. at 903 n.4 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
 
Green contends that the Court in Johnson recognized a 
right to not have a sentence determined by a vague residual 
clause in a law that fixes sentences because that “denies fair 
notice to defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement by 
judges.”  Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557.  He claims that he is 
asserting that same right here.  He contends that this right is a 
natural application of the reasoning of the Court’s decisions 
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in Johnson, Booker, and Beckles, because the residual clause 
in the Sentencing Guidelines contains the same language as — 
and was derived from the residual clause in — the 
ACCA.  Compare U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) (2001), with 18 
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).  Accordingly, he argues, the 
mandatory Sentencing Guidelines and the ACCA have an 
equivalent effect on a district court’s sentencing discretion.  Green 
maintains that the mandatory Guidelines raise the same 
constitutional infirmities as did the ACCA, as articulated 
in Johnson, and implicate an equivalent right to be free of the 
same unconstitutionally vague language.  Further, he argues 
that the Supreme Court has made clear that this right 
in Johnson applies to the mandatory Guidelines because the 
Court in Booker recognized a constitutional distinction 
between the mandatory Guidelines and the advisory 
Guidelines, Booker, 543 U.S. at 245, and then limited its holding 
in Beckles to the advisory Guidelines, Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 895. 
 
 The Government counters that Green takes an overly 
broad reading of the “right” that was recognized in Johnson.  It 
contends that the Supreme Court has never recognized a due 
process right to bring a vagueness challenge to the mandatory 
Sentencing Guidelines.  To the contrary, it argues that the 
Court in Beckles held that the advisory Guidelines cannot be 
challenged on vagueness grounds, and in so doing, expressly 
“le[ft] open” and “t[ook] no position on” the question of 
whether the mandatory Guidelines could be challenged on 
vagueness grounds.  Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 903 n.4 (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring).  The Government contends that if a question 
has been expressly left open by the Supreme Court, by 
definition it has not been “recognized by the Supreme Court.”  
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3).  We agree. 
 
13 
 
If Johnson had provided the last word on this issue, we 
might be persuaded by Green’s arguments; however, we are also 
bound by the Court’s ruling in Beckles.  Before Beckles was 
decided, we, along with the majority of the Courts of Appeals to 
consider the question, concluded that the holding in Johnson 
dictated that the residual clause in the now-advisory Sentencing 
Guidelines was also void for vagueness.2  But in Beckles, the 
Supreme Court did not apply Johnson to the advisory 
Sentencing Guidelines.  Instead, it cabined the reach of Johnson, 
making clear that despite identical language between the 
residual clauses of the ACCA and the Sentencing Guidelines, 
whether the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines are amenable to 
a vagueness challenge remains a separate and open question. 
 
Accordingly, in light of Beckles, Johnson’s holding as 
to the residual clause in the ACCA created a right only as to 
the ACCA, and not a broader right that applied to all similarly 
worded residual clauses, such as that found in the advisory 
Sentencing Guidelines.  The Supreme Court in Johnson 
recognized a right to not be sentenced under a statute that 
“fixed—in an impermissibly vague way—a higher range of 
sentences for certain defendants.”  Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 892.  
                                              
2 See United States v. Hurlburt, 835 F.3d 715, 725 (7th 
Cir. 2016) (en banc) (applying Johnson to the Sentencing 
Guidelines); United States v. Sheffield, 832 F.3d 296, 312-13 
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (same); United States v. Calabretta, 831 F.3d 
128, 133-34 (3d Cir. 2016) (same); United States v. Madrid, 
805 F.3d 1204, 1210-11 (10th Cir. 2015) (same); United States 
v. Pawlak, 822 F.3d 902, 911 (6th Cir. 2016) (same).  But see 
United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1193-96 (11th Cir. 
2015) (holding that Johnson did not apply to the Sentencing 
Guidelines). 
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It says nothing about a parallel right to not be sentenced under 
Sentencing Guidelines, whether advisory or mandatory. 
 
Thus, we agree with the Government that Johnson did 
not recognize a right to bring a vagueness challenge to the 
mandatory Sentencing Guidelines.  As the Court in Beckles 
clarified, that remains an open question.  By its very nature, the 
Supreme Court has not acknowledged any answer to an open 
question, let alone a definite one.  Since the Supreme Court has 
not determined whether the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines 
are even subject to vagueness challenges in the first instance, it 
certainly has not “recognized” the right to bring a successful 
vagueness challenge to the mandatory Guidelines’ residual 
clause.  And because no Supreme Court case has recognized the 
right that Green asserts, he cannot rely on 28 U.S.C. § 
2255(f)(3) to restart his applicable statute of limitations period. 
 
Our decision is in line with those of many of our sister 
circuits.  Faced with the same question, the Courts of Appeals 
for the Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits have also concluded 
that the Supreme Court has not “recognized” a right to bring a 
vagueness challenge to the mandatory Sentencing 
Guidelines.  See United States v. Greer, 881 F.3d 1241, 1247 
(10th Cir. 2018) (“The right that Mr. Greer ‘asserts’ is a right 
not to be sentenced under the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2) 
of the mandatory Guidelines.  The Supreme Court has 
recognized no such right.  And nothing in Johnson speaks to 
the issue.”); Brown, 868 F.3d at 299 n.1 (“If a question is 
expressly left open, then the right, by definition, has not been 
recognized.”);  Raybon v. United States, 867 F.3d 625, 630 
(6th Cir. 2017) (holding that “[b]ecause it is an open question, 
it is not a ‘right’ that ‘has been newly recognized by the 
Supreme Court’ let alone one that was ‘made retroactively 
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applicable to cases on collateral review.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255(f)(3))).3 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, 
has recently come to the opposite conclusion, holding that a 
petitioner can rely on 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) and timely file a 
petition challenging a sentence under the residual clause of the 
mandatory Sentencing Guidelines within one year 
of Johnson.  See Cross v. United States, 892 F.3d 288, 293-94 
(7th Cir. 2018).  We are not persuaded by the court’s brief 
analysis on this issue, which effectively reads “recognized” out 
of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) by not engaging in an inquiry into 
whether the right asserted by the petitioner is the same right 
that was recognized by the Supreme Court, and does not even 
acknowledge the fact that the Supreme Court in Beckles noted 
that this precise question remains open with respect to the 
mandatory Sentencing Guidelines. 
 
We also note that our decision in In re Hoffner, 870 F.3d 
301 (3d Cir. 2017), does not compel a different result.  
                                              
3 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has 
expressed doubts about the decisions reached by the Courts of 
Appeals for the Fourth and Sixth Circuits.  See Moore v. 
United States, 871 F.3d 72, 82-83 (1st Cir. 2017).  However, 
Moore concerned the different question of whether a petitioner 
was permitted to file a successive habeas petition in light of 
Johnson.  The timeliness question was not before the court.  
The court left the timeliness question, along with any 
determination on the merits, for the district court to decide in 
its consideration of the successive petition in the first instance, 
see id. at 84, and does not appear to have directly addressed 
those questions since. 
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In Hoffner, we considered only whether a petitioner had made 
a “prima facie showing,” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b)(3)(C), that his claim relied on Johnson such that he 
was entitled to file a successive petition.  Id. at 302-03.  In 
determining that the petitioner had done so, we applied a 
“permissive and flexible” standard, and expressly noted that it is 
for the district court to decide in the first instance whether the 
claim had merit or whether the petitioner’s reliance on Johnson 
“is misplaced.”  Id. at 308-09 (quoting In re Arnick, 826 F.3d 
787, 791 (5th Cir. 2016) (Elrod, J., dissenting)).  Here, by 
contrast, before reaching the merits of Green’s requested relief, 
we must consider the question we left to the district court 
in Hoffner, that is, whether Green can rely on Johnson as a rule 
“recognized by the Supreme Court.”  28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3).  
Thus, because we were concerned there only with whether the 
petitioner had satisfied this prima facie standard, Hoffner does 
not control our holding here.4 
 
 We hold that Green’s motion is untimely in light of the 
plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) and the Supreme 
Court’s indication in Beckles that it remains an open question 
whether the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines can be subject 
to vagueness challenges.  In so holding, we do not speak to the 
merits of Green’s claim, and do not decide whether the residual 
clause in the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines is 
unconstitutionally vague.  Only the Supreme Court can 
                                              
4 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has 
reached the same conclusion with respect to its own analogous 
precedent allowing the filing of a successive petition pursuant 
to § 2255(h)(2).  See Brown, 868 F.3d at 304. 
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recognize the right that would render Green’s motion timely 
under § 2255(f)(3).5 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
 
                                              
5 We note that if the Supreme Court does recognize such 
a right, Green would then have one year from that date to bring 
a subsequent petition relying on that decision. 
